1994 Total Solar Eclipse, part 3

Eclipse Chaser's Journal, Part 3.
The Wild One:
Total Solar Eclipse of November 3, 1994.

(Section 3 of 3)
(This section [3] is about Bolivia, and has NO relation to eclipses.)

by Jeffrey R. Charles.

Served at: www.eclipsechaser.com
Sponsored by: Versacorp

© Copyright 1994-1998, 2018, 2019 Jeffrey R. Charles.
All Rights Reserved.
This material is protected by Intellectual property laws. Any reproduction or commercial use without the prior express written and signed consent of Jeffrey R. Charles (and all other contributors, where applicable) is prohibited. Where permission for reproduction is granted, this notice and all credits must be preserved on each copy.

Comments: When it was first published in late 2019, the content of this web page was originally appended to the end of Section 2 of my 1994 Eclipse Journal. In 2021, a cyber attack on my ISP resulted in the loss of hundreds of web pages and images that had been uploaded in 2019 and 2020. These still existed on my local computer, but reviewing which files have been lost at the ISP, then uploading hundreds of files with an Internet connection that does not perform very well, takes a lot of time. When the material in this Section 3 web page was restored in 2023, it was moved to this separate (Section 3) web page. Accordingly the upload and "last modified" dates for this web page, and for the linked 75-page PDF links list, will be more recent than 2019.

Contents of Section 3 (this document):
(This section does not have internal links. Please scroll down to each chapter.)

General Comments:
* Unlike Sections 1 and 2, this Section 3 web page does not have dedications. This is because this Section 3 web page emphasizes political events in Bolivia, and those to whom the eclipse related Sections (1 - 2) were dedicated (Willma Alcocer, the ASO organization, etc.) are not "political" people or organizations.
* This 1994 Eclipse Journal is the only journal I have published that gets into political matters in a host country. This is because political matters were not imposed on me or those I knew during any other eclipse expedition.
* After the eclipse, I had maintained long term communication with certain Bolivian people I met on the 1994 eclipse expedition, and this led me to follow events in the country long after I left. The long term contact also provided some insight into subsequent events. The events of late 2019 were particularly concerning, and keeping track of it all led to the creation of the summary below, and to the associated linked 75 page reference list.

Political Groups and Exploitation of Religion: (1994 through present day)
* Over a long period of time, there may have been manipulation of some in the Bolivian religious community by politicians and their operatives. Speficically, it appears that a loosely knit political movement, as well as some politicians, were associated with certain men who were against poor and indigenous people. These tried to gain Christian support by claiming to be "Christian", and had possibly even infiltrated some churches. The same views where shared by men who made countless demands of me on and after 26 Oct., 1994, and most of those men had made it clear that they were opposed to indigenous people, the poor, and anyone who advocated for the same.
* Their modes of operation (and hyper-racist views against indigenous people) did not line up with true Christianity. It gave me the impression that it was "Christianity" in name only.
* The movement did not appear to have significant national political power in 1994, but they apparently did have some local influence, and a relative of one person I encountered had (as noted above) previously run for President of Bolivia, and a friend of another later became Vice President.
* More particularly, some among the men who had demanded that I make presentations at wealthy schools, while also trying to keep me from presenting at any school for poor or indigenous children (and some other people I met that these men knew) appeared to have a strange world view:
A Strange Political World View:
* Their world view was similar to a mixture of unbiblical versions of Postmillennial and Dominion Theology, in that they called themselves "Christian", yet they expressed contempt toward indigenous people, then did whatever they could to limit opportunity for them. They created the impression that they thought it was up to them to work toward bringing about their version of "heaven on earth". Some adherents to such theology even have the odd notion that doing this will in some way usher in Christ's return.
** To that end, people with such beliefs seemed to feel "entitled" to make social or political gains at the expense of others, to impose their will on others, to use corercion or other "non-Christian" methods to do so, and to appropriate or exploit anyone or anything that could otherwise benefit indigenous people. It wasn't enough that they gain. They wanted to take from the poor. Any actual Christian ministry or effort that these "entitled" people touched seemed to get ruined, partly because of their apparent motives and methods. Corercion and real Christianity don't mix.
** It was a classic example of people deluding themselves into thinking they were doing things "for God", then thinking that any means was justified. (And as would be seen 25 years after the eclipse, in the 2019 coup, there were many other people in Bolivia who appeared to operate this way!)
Political Faux Cristianity Can Reflect Badly on Real Christianity:
* The above circumstances could easily cause some to associate "Christians" and "churches" with the racist anti-indigenous views of the above noted men and their political movement. It was not just a matter of personal racial and economic bias or saying racial slurs. Theirs was a functional racism, and a functional elitism, in that they wanted to deny things to poor or indigenous people.
** At the time, it (unfortunately) appeared that many real Christians among those of European or mixed ancestry were not repudiating the group's rabid functional racism and economic bias. Silence in the Christian community would only help the group's ideology grow.
* This could have in turn contributed to persecution of evangelical churches when a government led by an Indigenous President came to power in 2006. This is one of the perils of generalization.
* It is not known if the group I encountered in 1994 was associated with any "behind the scenes" aspects of the 2019 coup, but the claim of being "Christian", combined with the negative views each expressed about indigenous people in both 1994 and 2019, were almost exactly the same. At the very least, it seemed that a common ideology was related to both.
* Both extremes (the so-called "Christian" political movement, and emphasis on Andean religions promoted by the indigenous president elected in 2005) are compelling examples of why "separation of Church and State" (in the way intended in the US Constitution) is a good idea.
* Lesson learned: Don't let your church, denomination, or religious community be "used" by a political party or group! Doing so will distort or even undermine the message of the gospel. The true nature of God is not determined by actions of those who claim to represent Him!

Cochabamba Water War: (1999-2000)
* The uprising commonly known as the "Cochabambia water war" is a classic example of privatization run amok.
* It began when the government privatized SEMAPA, the municipal water supply organization that served Cochabamba. It was taken over by Aguas del Tunari, which was a joint venture that involved the US company Bechtel and other multinational corporations.
* Privatization was originally a concession for a World Bank loan to Bolivia. However, in 1997, the city of Cochabamba fought this in court, and negotiated a new concession that required construction of a new dam as part of privatization.
* When privatization occurred in 1999, investors were then obligated to fund the new dam. Even though the matter of the dam was known from the outset, the new company raised water rates more than 30 percent in a short period of time. This proved to be a hardship for the local (and largely disenfranchiesd) indigenous people.
* Protests began, and a four day general strike was held in early 2000. In March, an informal local referendum showed 96 percent support for reversing privatization, but the government would not negotiate.
* Ultimately, tens of thousands of people marched on downtown Cochamamba and took over the central plaza. A battle with police followed, and least one civilian was killed.
* At about the same time, protest leaders went to what they thought was a meeting that had been arranged with the Governor, but it was a deceptive trap and they were arrested. Many protesters went into hiding, but more were found and arrested.
* The arrests and bad faith actions related to the so-called meeting with the Governor caused protests to spread to rural areas, and to other cities, including La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi. Some demonstrators barricaded major streets. A state of siege followed.
* In April, soldiers opened fire on protestes at a road block in Achacachi, killing two. The soldiers were then overpowered by protesters, who seized the military's weapons and turned them on the military leaders, wounding one officer and ultimately killing another. Police officers who were on strike fired tear gas at soldiers in LaPaz, but the goverment later bought off the police so they would turn on the protesters. This began to turn the tide against the protesters.
* But later, a Bolivian Army captain fired live conventional bullets into a crowd, and video of it was aired. Many were wounded, and a high school student was killed. This understandably enraged protesters to an extent that they gained ground again, and executives of the consortium involved with the municipal water supply fled from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz.
* According to the government, the consortium then pulled out of the privatization arrangement. Imprisoned demonstrators who had not been "disappeared" were later released.
* In April of 2000, the government reversed the privatization, but legal action by the consortium followed, and was not resolved until early 2001.
* More information about the Cochabamba Water War can be found on Oscar Olivera's book: "Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia".
* The Cochabamba water wars, as well as the then-ongling oppression of indigenous people, is also alluded to in the fictional (but partly based on actual events) movie called "Even the Rain".

Extreme Socio-Economic Inequality: What It Ultimately Brought About: (2005-2019)
* After observing extreme inequality between opportunities afforded to people of European descent versus those of indigenous descent in 1994 Bolivia, it was obvious that it would only be a matter of time until there was a backlash against the elitist "ruling class". I did not know if the backlash would be violent or peaceful, but I suspected that the outcome could easily be a socialist state, and maybe even a totalitarian state.
* Just to be on the safe side, fictional names and relationships were used for certain people mentioned in this 1994 Eclipse Journal, to protect their identity. If there was a backlash against the "ruling class" that was put down, and the wealthy increased their grip on the country, Bolivia's poor, and those sympathetic to their plight, could be at risk. Likewise, if indigenous people came to power, certain people who had oppressed the poor could be at risk if their names were known.
* I could also tell that oppression of indigenous people by the minority "ruling class" made Bolivia ripe for being exploited by socialists, possibly even with foreign backing. All that was needed was for a "champion" to emerge from the Indigenous ranks.
Electoral Backlash Against Anti-Indigenous Elites:
* This is what happened eleven years later, when Evo Morales was elected by popular vote in 2005. The Morales "Movement for Socialism" (MAS) party government was the first to represent and empower Bolivia's indigenous population. It had been preceded by five centuries of colonialism and rule by the minority elites of European or mixed descent.
* The election of Morales had been immediately preceded by two years of sporadic protests against privatization of Bolivia's natural gas resources, which resulted in gas being sold to U.S. companies at below market value. About 80 people had been killed in clashes between police and activists who were blocking the main road into La Paz. Morales did not actively participate in the clashes, but he later led calls for the President of Bolivia (Sanchez de Lozada) to resign because of the number of protesters killed.
* The President ultimately resigned and was replaced by his Vice President, Carlos Mesa in 2003. But Mesa did not reverse the natural gas privatization that had been the focus of protests, so the protests continued.
* By 2005, Morales' MAS party became Bolivia's largest national party. Carlos Mesa later resigned, partly due to continuing protests, and a general election was called in 2005. Morales then won the election by nearly a 2:1 margin.
* Durng Morales' first term, his regime had to make compromises to keep the peace with powerful sepratist civic organizations in the Santa Cruz area that were associated with wealthy families who controlled most of the natural gas industry. One of the things Morales had to put on hold because of this was land reform.
Leveling the Playing Field and Growing the Economy:
* The Morales regime took steps to increase rights and opportunities for indigenous people, but (unfortunately) this was not really on an equal basis. Economic policies of the Morales regime tended to favor indigenous and poor people who were members of the MAS political party over those who were not.
* The economic policies led to a reduction in extreme poverty among party members and a few others, but they did not eliminate extreme poverty for the rest of the poor. The result was to reduce extreme poverty by about half. Still, this is more progress for indigenous people than had been made under any previous regime.
* By 2009, the economy had improved, possibly in part because more people had been empowered to meaningfully participate in the economy. MAS also did not take Socialism to the extremes Venezuela had, so investment in, and taxable profit from, Bolivia's mining and natural gas sectors continued.
* Rather than nationalizing all companies that exploited natural resources (as Venezuela had) the Morales regime allowed many businesses to remain private, but imposed a relatively high tax on profits from natural resources. This had some similarity to the "Windfall Profits Tax" that the Carter administration had implemented in the USA back in 1980, but there were also several differences. The new Bolivian tax increased government revenues that could be used for infrastructure, health care, and social programs. But there were also downsides to the Morales regime.
The Downsides:
* For a while, Morales sought to make native Andean religion the State religion. This led to persecution of some other religions that had not combined certain aspects of Andean religion with their own.
* Soon after Morales came into power, there was also backlash against centuries of oppression of indigenous people by the former "ruling class".
** As the socialist Morales regime expanded its power, it also began persecuting groups that had not oppressed indigenous people. Persecuted groups included evangelical churches, most of which had not oppressed anyone. (In fact, some persecuted churches were made up entirely of indigenous people!) Ultimately, I heard that even some of the churches that I had visited in 1994 were shut down at least temporarily because of the Morales regime or its goons.
* There was also an influx of Cuban people who took over many key administrative and medical care, etc. positions. This had the effect of removing Bolivian people from such positions, but that may have been the whole idea, since some Bolivian people who had held such positions were not exactly all-in on Socialism.
* The socialist Morales regime was corrupt, but it had been elected. The minority "ruling class" had brought this upon themselves, and (unfortunately) on many others who did not necessarily see it as a good thing.
Term Limit Controversy:
* In 2014, Morales found a way around Constitutional term limits via the courts so he could run for a third term, and he handily won that election. This was not unprecedented in Latin American politics.
* In February 2016, Bolivia held a referendum to determine if term limits should be extended so Morales could run for a fourth term. Morales lost this referendum by a margin of almost 3 percent (48.7 percent for, 51.3 percent against).
* However, Morales then proposed to the Constitutional Tribunal that article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights applied to the situation. (Claiming that being prevented from running again violated his rights.) The tribunal agreed, as did Secretary General Luis Almagro. This made it possible for Morales to run for a fourth term in the next (2019) election.
* But this was controversial. The view of some on the Right and Far Right was that any fourth term for Morales would be illegitimate. The Far Right was also hungry for power, partly because they wanted to privatize, or lower taxes on, natural resources (lithium, oil, natural gas, etc.) to benefit the elites in their ranks.
The Seeds of a Coup:
* As early as 2008, the Far Right orchestrated protests and even riots against the Morales regime. Some airports were even taken over in one of these uprisings. There was also a foiled assassination plot against Morales in 2009.
* After the term limit referendum of Februaty 2016, it is alleged that some associated with wealthy Santa Cruz area interests began plotting basic aspects of a coup. By about May of 2019, it is alleged that coup planners decided that the coup would begin after the October elections, should Morales win. It is likely that a coup would have been planned even if Morales had won the earlier 2016 referendum. This is because the coup was mostly about Elites wanting to regain power.
* Over the coming months, sixteen audio recordings that were alleged to be coup planning discussions were leaked, and Morales learned of the plot. The recordings named names and even addressed how much money would be allocated to bribe certain members of the security forces (i.e. military and police). Morales mentioned his knowledge of a planned coup, but few seemed to take him seriously.
A Contested 2019 Election:
* On 20 October 2019, Morales ran for a fourth term, but was accused of election tampering in the vote. To clear things up, Morales invited the Organization of American States (OAS) to audit the election. This was probably a mistake, because the OAS often is not neutral regarding leftist candidates.
* After an investigation, the OAS allegedly found anomalies in a small percentage of the vote count. However, even if ballot irregularities in favor of Morales were excluded, he had still won the election, but simply not by the 10 percent margin required to avoid a runoff. Some references indicate that initial OAS statements did not highlight this crucial fact.
* Specifically, in a 3-way race, the initial quick count showed that Morales was at 45 percent, while Carlos Mesa (who had been Vice President, then President, in the early 2000's) was at 38 percent, with 83 percent of the votes counted.
* But then, there was a pause in the count, possibly due to a delay in getting paper ballot results from rural areas. After counting resumed, the final results were that Morales had won 46.8 percent of the vote, while Carlos Mesa had 36.7 percent. The OAS and the opposition cried foul.
** The OAS crying foul over this seemed to be a double standard in light of elections in the USA.
*** For example, the Mayor of Mackay Idaho (USA) was re-elected in 2019 by a single vote in a 3-way race. His percentage was lower than that of Morales, yet there was no runoff. Specifically, the incumbent Mayor of Mackay received 81 votes, the next candidate received 80 votes (only 1.2 percent less than the incumbent), and the last received 32 votes.
*** This means that the Mayor of Mackay was re-elected with only 41.5 percent of the vote. That's 3.5 percent lower than the lowest possible percentage for Morales in Bolivia (45 percent). There was no suspected fraud in Mackay, but the winning percentage was lower than in Bolivia, and there was no runoff election. Maybe not even a canvas or recount.
*** Winning a 3-way election by a narrow margin, with less than half of the total vote, and with no recount being required, is normal in may parts of the USA.
*** Yet the OAS was quick to cry foul in Bolivia after Morales won by an unquestioned 7 percent margin - which was 5 times greater than the margin in Mackay. (I am not taking one side or the other in this. I'm just pointing out the numbers.)
Protests and Violence Incited by Far-Right Bolivian Elitists:
* Widespread protests against Evo Morales followed, and his Bolivian regime began to weaken. The protests were incited and funded partly by the same elites in the natural gas indistry who were behind the alleged planned coup. These protests were followed by physical attacks on, and kidnaping the families of, Morales' MAS party members.
* In early November, the MAS Mayor of one Bolivian town was dragged down a street by far-right extremist protesters, restrained while her hair was cut, then doused in red paint and forced to walk down the main street on her bare feet. The police did nothing to stop it. The BBC reported that the town hall was then set on fire.
* The home of Morales' sister was also set on fire. Again, the police did nothing. The coup against Morales had begun, and it would soon reach its climax.
* On 10 November 2019, the Morales government offered to hold new elections, but this was rejected by the opposition.
Coup d'etat:
* Later on 10 November, the Morales presidency ended when he fled to Mexico after a coup that culminated in an ultimatum from both an influential right wing extremist from Santa Cruz (L.F. Camacho), and from the military. The military had begun to favor the former elitist "ruling class" after allegedly being bought off by the wealthy extremist.
* There is no doubt that it was a coup. When the military "suggests" that you resign, you don't have to be a rocket scientist to know that failure to comply could easily result in "sudden onset lead poisoning" from a bunch of bullet holes. The subsequent purge of certain elected MAS officials, other MAS party members, and prompt mass oppression of indigenous people and independent journalists, is also consistent with a full blown coup d'etat.
* The political shoe was once again on the other foot, yet there was almost no outside media coverage.

Resurgence of an Eerily Familiar Political Ideology (Coup of 2019):
* Evo Morales resigned as President of Bolivia and fled to Mexico after a coup that culminated on 10 Nov. 2019. (Precursors to the coup are summarized above.)
* After his resignation, Morales cited the coup, and wanting to end far-right violence against members of his MAS party as the main reasons. But his resignation did not stop the far-right violence.
* His Vice President, Alvaro Marcelo Garcia Linera (second in the line of Presidential succession) also resigned, as did Victor Borda, president of the Chamber of Deputies (fourth in the line of succession).
* As of when this was written, it was unclear if the third person in the line of succession (President of the Sentate Adriana Salvatierra) and First Vice President of the Senate Ruben Medinaceli (fifth in line) voluntarily resigned, were forced to resign, or were forcibly kept out of the Senate. (References exist for the first and last possibilities.)
The Power Grab:
* In the (imposed) absence of top figures of the Morales government, an UN-elected "interim" government soon formed.
* On 12 November 2019, right wing opposition senator (and former TV presenter) Jeanine Anez, who was Second Vice President of the Senate (sixth in the line of succession), swore herself in as the "Interim" President. However, this was approved without a quorum in the Senate.
* The new opposition minority interim government claimed to be "Christian", and its earliest officially stated position was that it wanted to be inclusive.
The Purge:
* However, the coup regime's claims of wanting to be "inclusive" were mixed wtih behind-the-scenes firings of Morales' appointees, deportations, threats against journalists, and racist rhetoric from some elitist coup backers and participants who said that they wanted to purge indigenous people from certain government positions, and even purge certain religions.
* The transition might have gone better if the elitists of the former "ruling class" had shown some restraint when taking over. But as it was, the interim opposition regime inflamed the situation in only two days, partly by failing to disavow declarative statemens that some elitists in their ranks made about the roles indigenous people may or may not be allowed to play.
* In addition, only one of the first sixteen appointed interim cabinet members was indigenous (at a time when symbolism was important), while at least 40 percent of the country is made up of indigenous people.
* Further, the regime disrespected the Wiphala, which is the indigenous flag. Many among the security forces cut the Wiphala patch from their uniforms, then they and some others burned large Wiphala flags in public.
* All of this provoked supporters of Morales and many other indigenous people throughout Bolivia. Morales also fanned the flames to a degree via his tweets from Mexico. However, the coup regime's egregious actions had inflamed the situation to such an extent that Morales' tweets may have had little effect.
* Protests soon followed, and spread to most major cities in Bolivia.
The Coup Turns Deadly:
* The UNelected "interim" regime showed a seemingly "entitled" attitude when, on 14 November, it unilaterally decreed that the military and police were exempt from criminal prosecution - even if they killed unarmed protesters. (Liberal media called it the "License to Kill" decree.) This was incredibly ill-advised and dangerous, and it seemed to arise from prejudice, weakness, insecurity, or even hatred or paranoia on the part of some coup regime leaders. It also showed that Bolivia may have been better off if Anez had remained a television presenter. (Insecure or paranoid people can be cruel and totalitiarian leaders if they get in power.) It was a sadly pivotal event.
* Predictably, at least five unarmed protesters were massacred in Sacaba (just east of Cochabamba) the very next day.
* After the Sacaba massacre, indigenous people demanded that Anez resign, but the coup regime would not negotiate. To put pressure on the coup regime, thousands of indigenous people in El Alto blockaded major roads, including the road used to transport natural gas from the Senkata gas plant into LaPaz. The bloackade also helped keep military ground forces at bay, in the hope of preventing another massacre.
* Only a few days later, on 19 Nov., there was another massacre near the Senkata gas plant in El Alto, near La Paz. The Coup Regime forces initially flew a military jet low over El Alto at high speed, but did not strafe the area. But then, coup regime forces fired on people from a helicopter. Ground forces broke through the blockade for long enough to get a few dozen gas trucks through, after which the blockade was restored.
* In all, 23 were killed and over 200 were wounded in the first week. More were killed and wounded in later weeks.
* Unconfirmed reports from people in rural areas also indicated oppression and even killing of rural indigenous people in areas where no one had a phone or camera to document attrocities. Areas mentioned included Chapare, Challapata, and along the road between Oruro and LaPaz. And this may only be the unfortunate beginning. I had been in some of these areas back in 1994. It is tragic to think that some of these same areas may have now become killing fields.
* The 23 dead and over 200 wounded is a very high number of civilian casualties for one week, given that the population of Bolivia is only 11.5 million. To put this into perspective, if the same percentage of people were slaughtered and wounded in the USA (population 329M), there would be 658 dead and over 5,000 wounded in a single week. That would cause nationwide outrage if it happened in the USA, yet the mainstream media was silent about the slaughter and maiming of indigenous Bolivians.
* The US Congress was also silent about the coup and massacres, with the exception of Senator Bernie Sanders, and later Rep. Tulsi Gabbard. The reason for this silence was soon obvious: Two tweets from the US President implied US involvement in the coup. The US Congress was also distracted by their obsession with impeachment hearings.
A Coup Regime Instead of a "Neutral" Interim Government:
* The "interim" Bolivian government that seized power in 11/2019 was supposed to be neutral and promptly call elections - but the regime was not neutral and did not promptly call elections.
* During this delay, the coup regime dismantled much of what the Morales regime accomplished, redirected institutionality (replaced some public sector personnel based on political loyalties), threatened to charge "disloyal" journalists with sedition, arrested or detained well over a thousand people, and terrorized others who did not support its actions.
* It was a coup, and the term "interim" may have been used to lull people into thinking there would be near term free and fair elections. (If there are elections, as the coup regime claims there will be in March 2020, they should be scrutinized by neutral international organizations.)
* And it gets worse. Many who were swept up by the military and police were not heard from again, at least as of when this was written. As for those who survived being in custody, one human rights delegation from Argentina alleged that some, including even children, had been tortured and physically molested.
** The cause was clear: With its racist actions, the coup regime had "dehumanized" a segment of the population. Then, with a decree exempting the police and military from prosecution, the regime gave the vile among the security forces a green light to live out their vile and racist fantasies - at the expense of their prisoners!
* At first, the coup regime denied that their security forces had shot anyone, and local media (which had sold out to the coup regime) reported the regime's fake news that the deaths were from indigenous people shooting each other.
* The families of most people massacred in El Alto by the coup regime could not afford coffins, so "Codepink", a womens' anti-war NGO, arranged to buy coffins for them. Medea Benjamin of Codepink was one of the last people to get honest journalism out of Bolivia, at a time when the coup regime was rounding up journalists that they considered "disloyal".
* I learned some of what I know about the coup from watching video from people embedded with various groups in Bolivia during the crisis, including video of people being massacred (both up close and from a distance), before such videos were taken down or restricted.
Bolivia's Indigenous People Organize to Counter Coup Regime's Fake News:
* Thousands of indigenous people, some from as far away as Potosi, held an open air meeting on the main highway in El Alto, where they organized a funeral procession from Senkata in El Alto (the site of the 19 Nov. massacre) down through La Paz.
** The open air meeting was also used to mobilize protests across the country, and to read the demands that would be presented to the coup regime. If the demands were met, the blockades would be suspeneded and negotiations could begin. The demands were:
1.) Anez must resign as interim President, mostly because of murders of protesters.
2.) A neutral interim government must be elected.
3.) The government and people must respect the indigenous flag, the Wiphala.
4.) Security forces who disrespected (burned) the Wiphala, and coup leader L. F. Camacho, must be prosecuted.
5.) Police and military must go back to their barracks.
6.) Government must recognize deaths of indigenous people killed by security forces.
7.) The electoral commission must not be connected to any political party.
8.) [Demand 8 was not stated, but it may have been that the regime rescind its "license to kill" decree, then prosecute those who made the decree or killed unarmed protesters.]
9.) In new elections, people like Carlos Mesa (who was harmful) should not run.
10.) All indigenous people and other prisoners must be released within 48 hours.
* The funeral procession that was organized at the open air meeting was partly to show the general population that unarmed people were being killed by the police and military. (Local news did not cover the massacres, since they would have been "disloyal" to the coup regime if they had.)
** However, the military blocked the route of the funeral procession before it could reach certain parts of La Paz, then disbursed everyone (10,000 people) with tear gas. As a result of the tear gas attack on the funeral procession, the coffins were temporarily left sitting in the street.
* Negotiations through late November led to removal of blockades in El Alto, though all of the demands of the indigenous people were not met. Specifically:
** The coup regime did not implement demands 1, 2, 4, and 9.
** The regime only partially complied with demand 5 [and demand 8].
** Demands 3 and 6 were met for the most part.
** The extent to which the coup regime agreed to demands 7 and 10 was not known as of when this was written.
* The coup regime eventually admitted to killing indigenous protesters and offered meager compensation to the families of the dead. Their offer was a paltry 50,000 Bolivianos (US $7,000) per person killed. The National Confederation of Indigenous Peasant Women from Bolivia considered the offer, but decided to declare a state of emergency and go into permanent mobilization to pressure the coup regime to allow free and fair elections.
* In its first weeks, the new 2019 far-right coup regime proved to be one of the most brutal regimes that Bolivia had seen in decades. This initially drew the ire of only a few Human Rights organizations, but the financial world noticed, in that the resulting turmoil also caused Bolivia's credit ratings to be downgraded. A few other human rights organizations later woke up to the situation, but belated responses from some seemed unduly muted.
Little Change in Bolivian Elitist Ideology Between 1994 and 2019:
* Based on the attitudes I observed in 1994, there may be no limit to the harm the elitist "ruling class" movement might do to indigenous people (including indigenous political rivals) if they think they can get away with it. Based on what was seen in 1994, it could be an ideology that thinks any means is justified. When power for the sake of power and control is the objective of a movement, the welfare of those under its control will be less important to it than maintaing power. Exposing what the coup regime is doing may contribute to their becoming less eager to continue with such strong repression.
* The views toward indigenous people that appear to be held by some of those who seized power after Morales resigned in 2019 seem eerily similar to views of wealthy people with political connections that I had the misfortune of encountering on my 1994 trip to Bolivia. Namely, they call themselves "Christian", but some of them appear to be rabidly against equal opportunity, education, or position for indigenous people. The highest profile official 2019 interim leaders were not at first openly expressing this bias, but they also were not quelling its expression from LFC and other elitists in their own ranks.
* There is a vast difference between what "political correctness" types in Western countries of the northern hemisphere call "racist" and the functional racism of the "interim" Bolivian regime. Rather than simply holding or expressing "racist" views, the Bolivian regime has been killing, injuring, detaining, firing, demoting, and oppressing people based on their race or political views, and perhaps also based on merely objecting to oppression of indigenous people.
Mass Repression Under the Guise of "National Security"
* Less than two weeks after the coup regime seized power, it began falsely labeling people who simply disagreed with it as "terrorists", then (to use the coup regime Interior Minister's own words) it started "hunting" some of them down. They even tagged some journalists and human rights organizations with this label.
* It also came to light that a major player in the coup (another who exploited the term "Christian") was from a family that had long owned one of the largest natural gas conglomerates in the Santa Cruz area. Not surprisingly, he announced that he would run for President after the coup. (Why am I not surprised. Help lead a coup, and presto! - a new opening for the presidency!)
* At least one group associated with Camacho is alleged to have had ties to the Nazis from WW2, in that some in the Santa Cruz area oligarchy who were causing the trouble in Bolivia were said to be descended from Croatians who collaborated with Germany, then fled to Bolivia after WW2. Some area civic groups and youth organizations even retained some aspects of this connection, including a variant of the "heil" salute.
Coup Regime and OAS Double Down on Their Fake News
(Because history is written by the victors - even when the "history" written is not true.)

* The initial OAS report failied to highlight that Morales had won the election even if anomalies in the count were excluded. This concealed the fact that Morales had won the election regardless. Third parties pointed out that the OAS had compared the "Quick Count" to the final count when it initially declared anomalies, and that there were actually fewer anomalies than the OAS had initially indicated. The coup regime set out to counter this argument.
* Within a month of the coup, the coup regime (and media that sold out to them) began promoting several false narratives. Most fake news from the coup regime was little more than the regime projecting its own actions, and actions of the far right, onto the indigenous protesters.
* Specifically, one new narrative was that indigenous protesters had committed mass vandalism and set homes of the right wing opposition on fire. But there were problems with this fake narrative:
** First, no one embedded with the indigenous people observed such vandalism.
** Second, and more importantly, most video that the regime and media claimed showed the homes of the right wing opposition being burned down PRE-DATED the time that it was alleged such crimes had been committed. This is known because some of the same video of houses burhing had been posted to YouTube BEFORE the time that it was alleged that indigenous people had burned houses down. The video was actually of houses that far right activists had previously set on fire.
** It was clearly FAKE NEWS by the far right regime and their media lap dogs.
* Soon, the OAS piled on, changing its story to say that there had been "malicious manipulation and serious irreguarities" in the 20 October election. This is reaching, since the word "malicious" is implies malicious motive that can't be supported by any evidence.
* Additional fake news tried to argue that what happened was not a coup, instead calling it a "revolution". Yet, in late November, one member of the coup regime gloated that the objective had been to "overthrow the government".
* In addition to fake news, the coup regime has been promoting the idea that Morales' MAS party will only win 20 to 25 percent of Senate seats in the next election. This seems unusual, since almost 2/3 of the Senate was (and presumably still is, as of late 2019) made up of elected MAS Senators. Yet the coup regime is declaring that this number will magically be lowered by 40 percent in the next election. (Maybe the coup regime is signaling that will refuse to allow over half of the MAS Senators participate in the 2020 election?) If so, it is more proof that what happened was a coup.
The Real Purpose of the Coup:
* Instigating a deceptive coup, based on religious pretenses, was a very harmful and dangerous way to change presidents. And there lies the problem:
** It never was about only the presidential election.
** And it was not about religion (unless driven by unscriptural delusion).
** It WAS about natural resources, money, power, racism, and elitist culture:

** The elites in Bolivia did not simply want a new president.
** They wanted a new regime.
** They wanted all of the power.
** They wanted all of the land.
** They wanted all of the money from Bolivia's coca, fossil fuels, and lithium.
** And they could not stand to continue sharing any of Bolivia's weath with the noble indigenous peoples that they had oppressed for 500 years.
* Manifest Destiny 2.0: It is starting to look like a reboot of "Manifest Destiny", only this time in Latin America.
It Wasn't About the Economy (Unless Elites Dislike a Growing Economy)
* Prior to the coup, Bolivia's economy was set to grow by nearly 4 percent in 2019. This was considerably better than average for South America. The GDP per capita was still low, since indigenous people had been disenfranchised in the decades and centuries before the Morales regime, and a small indigenous middle class was only starting to form at the time of the 2019 coup.
* After the coup, the Bolivian economy has been at risk of decline. This is because the coup regime seemed more interested in consolidating power than in the economy. The regime seemed to care mostly about itself and elites it was beholden to.
* Under the coup regime, the economy began to change from one that benefitted a broad spectrum of people, to a "trickle down" economy that favors the wealthy elites. The best illustration I have seen of a "trickle down" economy is a cartoon of two outhouses stacked on top of each other. The top one is reserved for the elites. The bottom one is for everyone else.
* The 2019 coup shows that there may not be much difference in the corruption and brutality of a regime on either the right or the left. Naked lust for power or riches is an equal opportunity corruptor.
* I was not a fan of the Morales regime, but the "replacement" appears to be considerably worse.

Initial Aftermath of the 2019 Coup, and What Can be Done About It: (2019)
* The coup and its aftermath had a myriad of effects in a short time. Oppression and violence against indigenous people has to stop. This must start with the regime. But if the regime will not voluntarily stop its oppression, outside pressure should be applied.
The Bolivian Coup Regime:
* If members of the new Bolivian regime really are Christian, they should act like it and stop oppressing and killing unarmed civilans. A new government cannot claim any moral high ground over the previous corrupt socialist regime if they continue to oppress and kill unarmed indigenous civilians. In its first week, the 11/2019 regime forfeited any high ground it might have otherwise had. Their bullets spoke louder than their words or religious symbols. Time for them to eat some humble pie.
The Bolivian Population:
* I am not going to make many suggestions here, since people in Bolivia know what they are doing a lot more than anyone (like me) in a remote location could possibly know.
* But it would be helpful if each leader of the coup regime, and each member of the government, the police, and the military listens to their conscience and makes a morally informed decision about who they will defend going forward. It is up to each person to decide if they want a clear conscience, and if so, to determine what will let them maintain (or try to regain) a clear conscience, as opposed to what could instead result in a lifetime of haunting images and regret from brutality or ill-gotten gain.
The World Including the Press:
* It will be important for the international community to closely monitor what the "interim" coup regime is doing, carefully scrutinize any future elections, and invesitgate the degree to which the coup regime may harass, threaten, imprison, exile, or otherwise prevent its political opponents from effectively running in any election.
* Another thing that should be monitored is whether the regime engages in voter intimidation. After the massacres and numerous tear gas attacks on peaceful protests in 2019, people could be afraid to go out and vote in early 2020. Here, it could be useful if independent journalists and human rights workers are embedded among indigenous people in some areas for up to a month before the election, so any harassment by the far right regime or associated civic groups, thugs, or mercinaries (which would further intimidate voters) can be documented and revealed to the world.
* It will also be useful if there are enough human rights workers to safely escort significant numbers of indigenous people to their polling locations.
* Yet another thing to monitor is if the coup regime or its allies restrict or otherwise disript rural transportation that indigenous people would normally use to get to the polls. The same would be true of monitoring if there is fair media access for indigenous candidates.
* Independent journalists may have to go underground to get the truth out, since the coup regime (particularly the Interior Minister) has shown a tendency to label those who disagree with it (including human rights organizations) as "terrorists". Such accusations lack credibility, but the unfounded labeling increases the danger that the coup regime may pose to the population. With its labeling of even imagined opponents, the coup regime may be a threat to indigenous and non-indigenous people alike.
* It is very important that all people (including the news media) make a distinction between a political group or party that may express unbiblical views in word and deed, while exploiting the term "Christian" (or people that get delusions of grandeur from misinterpretation of the Bible), and actual Christians. There is a huge difference. Showing off a big Bible does not a Christian make.
The Christian Community:
(Why Christians Should Consider NOT Supporting the "Christian" Coup Regime in Bolivia.)
* The 2019 Bolivian coup regime presents a unique and serious problem for the Christian community. This is because the regime unabashedly called itself "Christian" while having acted in dramatically UN-Christian and cruel ways.
* Real Christians (as in Christian by religion, not political party name or alignment) should prayerfully consider repudiating the cruel Bolivian regime of 11/2019, or at the very least, condemning the race-based violence and repression of this far right Bolivian regime, and any similar regimes that may follow.
* And, it is important to pray about the entire situation.
** This would include praying that the coup regime and its supporters refrain from more cruel acts, and that, if the coup regime principals and supporters are currently "Christian in name only", that they will come to actually receive Christ, then let the Holy Spirit call the shots in their lives, ambitions, and decisions. (If that happens, ALL of the oppression and killing by the coup regime should stop, and they would allow truly free and fair elections.)
** It is equally important to pray that the indigenous population does not become embittered against true Christianity (which is simply receiving Jesus Christ as savior, with no politics attached) because of the acts of the so-called "Christian" regime. (Temporary earthly regimes that claim to be "Christian" are toying with peoples' eternal lives.)
** It is also equally important to pray for MAS party members (including Evo Morales and other top MAS party officials), and all indigenous, poor, and other people of Bolivia. This can include that they also receive Christ. Only He can fill the void left from the sudden loss of political power and social gains, and then people can petition Him concerning their unjust oppression. Real Christianity is not what has been presented by the coup regime. Their actions do not determine who Christ really is.
* All of this is important because the Bolivian coup regime claims to be "Christian", while their actions drag Christianity through the mud. When the goal of a coup regime is to usurp an entire country, usurping religion is not a big deal for them.
* If no one in the Christian community speaks up, many in the world may incorrectly believe that real "Christians" actually support the brutal far right regime that may want to turn Bolivia into feudal society like one from the dark ages.
* Also, many of Bolivia's indigenous people are Christian, but the UNelected so-called "Christian" regime oppresses them just as much as it oppresses other indigenous people. This makes it abundantly clear that oppression by the coup regime is based on race, not on religion. (Even if it was based on religion, it would still be wrong.)
* The Bolivian coup of 2019 has the unfortunate potential to set back free will reception of the gospel (free will is the only way it can be received) by a generation in Latin America: It seems unlikely that people (especially indigenous people) will get a warm fuzzy feeling about Jesus Christ from the principals of the coup. (If the coup leaders really were Christian, they certainly lost sight of the fact that Christ's kingdom is not of this world.)
** The coup leaders have caused a lot of damage. Only the Holy Spirit can address the grievous damage the coup leaders have done in the hearts and minds of indigenous people throughout the world.
** If Christians don't make a distinction between the words and actions of the coup leaders and true Christianity themselves, it is unlikey that the rest of the world will make the a distinction either. This is important. It should inform what churches we support, what charities we support, and even how we vote. Where we stand on a brutal Latin American regime that claims to be "Christian" is a moral issue, just as positions on right to life and certain other domesic matters are moral issues. But there can be common ground between right and left concerning repudiation of the Bolivian coup regime.
** After September 11, 2001, people who practice Islam were faced with a similar problem of public perception. They had to distance themselves from the radical ideology and actions of the 9/11 terrorists, to keep the world from thinking they would approve of what happened on 9/11.
** Now, those of us who are Christian find ourselves in a similar situation in Bolivia and elsewhere - because Bolivian coup leaders usurped the term "Christian", while behaving in radical and dramatically UN-Christian ways.
** For many indigenous peoples in Bolivia, the 2019 coup, with its related massacres, was their 9/11.
** Therefore, real Christians must distance themselves from the Bolivian coup regime, and appropriation of the term "Christian" by the coup's brutal so-called "'interim" government. Otherwise, the world will have reason think that Christians approve of the coup and its deadly aftermath. More importantly, mass repudiation of the so-called "Christian" coup regime by real Christians around the world may also help bring external presure to bear on the coup leaders.
* And Christians inside and outside of Bolivia should not assume that persecution of Bolivian Christians will be reduced just because the far-right coup regime calls itself "Christian". It could be quite the opposite. (Remember El Slavador in the 1980's? There, the far-right killed 4 nuns, 7 priests including Oscar Romero, and hundreds to thousands of others.)
** In Bolivia, more Christians and other people of conscience might have been killed or imprisoned during the first few weeks of the coup regime than the total number of people that were similarly dealt with during the 14 year Morales regime. The full scope of what has happened may not be known until Bolivia becomes transparent enough that human rights organizations have unfettered access.

Potential International Repercussions of the Coup:
* The Bolivian coup could backfire on a continental scale, in that some far-right regimes in Latin America may fall to leftists who win fair elections, or to leftist coups.
** Even if new leftist regimes are so far left as to degrade the economy (as happened in Venezuela), leftist propaganda is pushing the notion that people may now have the opinion that they would rather be poor in a Socialist regime, as opposed to being dead in a far-right one.
** If the left takes over Latin America again, the landed elites and their allies will have brought it all on themselves.
** One can only hope that any new regimes and the general population will make a distinction between the elites who oppressed the people, and real Christians who did not oppress anyone.
* The coup in Bolivia also has the potential to drive at least some other Latin American countries directly into the arms of Russia or China, since the coup has shown that an open alliance with a superpower may be a necessary part of preventing a coup that is assisted by a different superpower that has differing ideologies or corporate interests.
* And there could be refugees. Perhaps many from Bolivia's indigenous population. If the USA backed the coup (two of President Trump's tweets seem to indicate the USA did back it), then the USA has an obligation to accept people who had to flee the brutal far right coup regime.
** Concerning regime change coups and wars, Colin Powell once made a statment that can be summeed up as "you break it, you own it". This includes refugees.
** And after the coup, Bolivia is broken. Bolivian society is broken. Trust is broken. The security and safety of many indigenous Bolivian people is broken. (You don't feel safe if a regime sets fire to your house or says it will "hunt" you down.) And after years of stability, the Bolivian economy is beginning to decline because of the coup.
** If the US does not want to take in more refugees, it should stop breaking other countries and causing the very situations that make people have to flee as refugees in the first place.
* The Bolivian coup also turns the whole notion of what is required to be a "prepper" (i.e. survivalist) on its head. Within a week of when Morales resigned, the full weight of the Bolivian military and police forces were brought to bear on certain people and groups. And these forces were exempt from prosecution, no matter what they did. In these circumstances, targeted people had to flee their homes to save their lives. This meant that no amount of cached supplies, or even weapons, would have made much difference. The only thing that might have made a difference would be if there were multiple caches of resources at the locations people had to flee to. This could change the whole concept of "prepping" among survivalist groups or individuals.
* Moderate governments are usually better for stability, and for promoting a reduction in persecution. The deadly coup in Bolivia was clearly by the far-right, showing that either extreme can be dangerous.
** The Morales regime was leftist, but not as radically left as Venezuela or Cuba. His regime was by no means "moderate", but it was closer to being moderate than the 2019 coup regime.
** This is supported by the fact that Morales had not purged the political opposition or otherwise made it impossible to challenge him. He did "stack" some of the courts, but he had not stacked the police or military in his favor. His emphasis instead seemed to be infrastructure and social programs. He had allowed the very people who would commit the coup to continue to retain their wealth and hold office. By contrast, the far right coup regime made purging one of its first priorities.
* While participating in an Inter-American Dialogue panel discussion on 22 Nov. 2019, a member of the coup regime admitted that it was a coup, when he said of Camacho and Pumari: "They were essential in energizing the population, young people to overthrow the government."
* As for the finaciers, planners, and instigators of the deadly coup, a trial at the Hague might be a good idea. Because Indigenous Lives Matter. There should be little to no distinction between those who planned or knowingly financed the coup, and those who carried it out.

Getting the Truth Out of Bolivia: (2019 and Onward)
* By 24 November 2019, only 2 weeks after Morales resigned, the Bolivian coup regime had silenced all but a couple of journalists who were willing to put themselves at risk to get the truth out over the web. (And a regime that silences journalists is usually up to no good!)
** Some so-called journalists who had sold out to the regime actually handed what the regime called a "disloyal" journalist over to the Army, then he was never heard from again. After this, regime propaganda was about all that was reported. It was a collapse of corporate journalistic integrity in only two weeks, assuming there had been much integrity to begin with.
** People "turning each other in" was ominously similar to what happened in Germany before and during World War II.
** The coup has also shown that broadcast, print, and Internet based journalism, along with corporate journalists, may be too vulnerable to control by rogue regimes - and in a frighteningly short period of time!
Underground Independent Journalism:
* Therefore, it may be that people will have to go back to underground independent journalism, including using couriers or snail mail as alternate routes to get the truth out. Here, it might be good to compile the most important information, make numerous copies of it, then try to ship and carry them out via multiple people and routes at the same time.
Preserving Evidence of Human Rights Violations:
* Also, people everywhere can archive any information about attrocities that is posted to the Internet - before it is taken down. If such information shows up on the web (especially if Creative Commons), people can save it to disk so it can be re-uploaded by different people, if it gets removed from social media sites or other Internet sites at the behest of the regime or its allies. Some web pages can also be submitted to web archives such as archive.org for preservation outside of Bolivia. (A link to a list of several hundred articles and videos about the coup is included below.)
** In regard to archiving or distributing evidence, means other than social media, email, or conventional web pages can also be used. Evidence can be posted at sites from which it can be downloaded, but not directly viewed. This can help decouple distribution from the whims of "big tech" companies that may try to suppress information by eliminating it from search results, restricting it, or even taking it down.
* If possible, people who have authority to task radar and optical imaging satellites can examine Bolivia to see if there are mass graves in rural areas that may have been targeted by the coup regime. And, when it is safe to do so (may be safest after the coup regime is out of power) Human Rights organizations can conduct many more investigations and interviews.
Repudiating the Faux Christian Coup Regime:
* The far right overreached in Bolivia, promptly oppressing and killing indigenous people, while usurping the term Christian and dragging Christianity through the mud. The regime crossed the Rubicon with their decree that the police and military would not be prosecuted for harming civilians. This singular act was probably the genesis of most of the deaths, other human rights violations, and mass protests that followed. This shows abysmally bad judgment at best, and the regime's contempt for the indigenous population at worst. The coup participants had also terrorized some of their political rivals before the most visible phase of the coup.
** For these reasons, it is my opinion that the 2019 Bolivian coup regime, and any of its planned far-right successors, should not be in power.
** The coup regime and its supporters have revealed their functionally racist and brutal nature. They squandered any opportunity to be a uniting force in Bolivia by being the opposite from the start. Any country would be better off with a government that does NOT have the entitled, elitist, racist, and murderous baggage of the coup regime.
** A moderate government that preserves indigenous rights, minimizes privatization of natural resources (or at least taxes exported natural resources, using the revenue to benefit its own people), and that emphasizes representing the entire country and growing its economy to increase prosperity for everyone would appear to be a far better choice. Any privatization of natural resources should be taken off the table for a long time in order to keep the peace and maintain the economy during any regime transition.
* I say this as both a Christian and a conservative. I hope other Christians will repudiate the repression and killing of indigenous people by the coup regime, rather than blindly thinking that conservatives and far-right regimes can do no wrong.
Christians Should Get Out In Front of Faux Christian Coup Regime's UN-Christian Acts:
* The coup regime made itself a concern for real Christians to address when it called itself "Christian", then behaved in oppressive non-Christian ways.
* Because of this, the regime should be repudiated by the Christian communitiy.
** If the regime is not repudiated, some may wonder if the coup regime's behavior might be repeated whenever certain "Christians" (or others who emphasize religion) hold political office.
** One of the worst things the Christian community could do would be to double down on backing the so-called "Christian" Bolivian coup regime.
* It is unlikely that a regime that was so eager to grasp power will give it up or fairly share it without considerable outside pressure.
** The international Christian community can repudiate the Bolivian coup regime, along with the regime's non-Christian attitudes and actions. This can include writing representatives about the matter, and protesting if coup regime members visit each person's country.
** Repudiation of the so-called "Christian" coup regime by the Christian communitiy is where pressue on the regime can and should start.

* Solidarity with the indigenous peoples of Bolivia!
* And in your just cause of restoring a government that represents you!
* Solidaridad con los pueblos indígenas de Bolivia!
* Y en su justa causa de restaurar un gobierno que lo represente! Viva Bolivia!

The Bolivian Election of 2020 (Almost a Year After the Coup):
* On 18 October, 2020, another general election was held in Bolivia. This election would have happened within 90 days of the controversial 2019 election (as required by law), if the 2019 coup regime had been a true "Caretaker Government." However, a few months of the delay were due to the COVID-19 Pandamic.
* In the 2020 election, the Socialist MAS party won 55 percent of the vote, and secured majorities in both chambers of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly. The elected President was Luis Arce. Opponents had included Carlos Mesa of the Civic Community Party, Luis Fernando Camacho of the Creemos Party, and Jeanine Anez, the public face of the 2019 coup regime.
* The 2020 election superseded the results of the controversial 2019 elections. Of course, the 2020 election also superseded the results of the 2019 coup.

Aftermath of the 2020 Bolivian Election:
* A crackdown on the opposition that had participated in the 2019 coup followed the 2020 election. It is not known (by the author) if this crackdown went beyond actual participants in the 2019 coup d'etat and the massacres and purges that followed.
* On 12 March, 2021, Jeanine Anez was arrested and detained. On 10 June, 2022, after being convicted of "Breach of duties and resolutions contrary to the Constitution", she was sentenced to 10 years on prison. There were irregularities in the trial, including exclusion of the 2019 OAS documents.
* Arturo Murillo, Minister of Government in the former coup regime, fled to Florida in the USA, and has not been extradited. He was wanted in Bolovia for his role in the massacres in Senkata and Sacaba, among other things. However, in May of 2021, he and three others were arrested and charged with bribery and money laundering, allegedly involving about $600,000 un bribes to Bolivian officials and from a Florida based company, for the purpose of securiing Ministry of Defense contracts for associates, via bank accounts in the jurisdictions of Georgia and Florida. He pled guilty to some related charges in October of 2022.
* Luis Fernando Camacho had supported the 2019 coup, and had allegedly participated in it by having stated (along with the military) the 10 Nov. 2019 ultimatum against the Morales regime.
* Camacho was elected as the 2nd Governor of Santa Cruz in 2021. He had been vice president of the Santa Cruz Youth Union from 2002 to 2004, and President of the Civic Committed of Santa Cruz from 2019 to 2021. In late 2022, the Santa Cruz Civic Committed promoted an indefinite strike against the elected Arce government, and some regions experienced a strike for over a month.
* In December 2022, Camacho, then the sitting 2nd Governor of Santa Cruz, was arrested and detained without a warrant by Bolivian Police. Mass protests followed in Santa Cruz and the surrounding lowlands. In late December 2022, a 24 hour strike temporarily closed area border crossings. Camacho has remained incarcerated into 2023, though there have been no convictions as of when this was written. Some areas are said to have since become less stable.

References About 2019 Bolivian Coup, Plus Precursors and Subsequent Events:
* More details about the 2019 Bolivian coup can be found in my cumulative Bolivian coup links list (75 page PDF file) that archives links to video and articles about the coup, its precursors, and its aftermath. Many of these references were used when writing the coup-related material above. (The coup links are an excerpt from a larger link list that archives links to material about historical events in politics, crime, and war; some of which is controversial.)
* References in the PDF list are not hyperlinked, so it is necessaary to copy and paste the URL's (text with web addresses) into a browser to follow the links.
* Several links are to material published or streamed by people or NGO's (codepink, etc.) that were embedded with various groups in Bolivia during the 2019 political crisis. It may be one of the first coups in history in which large volumes of video from embedded journalists became available in real time.
* Some material linked in the list shows people being massacred (both up close and from a distance), before such videos were taken down or restricted. Therefore, viewer caution is advised.
* The first three pages of the link list cover events prior to the 2019 coup.
* The link list below includes over 200 links related to the 2019 Bolivian coup. (This assumes that the linked material does not get censored!) Most material is by independent journalists, since most of the western mainstream media ignored or whitewashed the coup.
* Links followed by "!!..." are usually among the best ones.
* I made the link list durng the events of 2019, because certain references I had read or watched had not shown up in subsequent searches, even though they were still there if I entered the URL.
* After publication in 2019, and its last update in 3/2020, the link list has not been reviewed to see if the links remain good over time. Given the dynamic nature of Internet platforms during the subsequent COVID-19 Pandemic, I would not be surpised if a great deal of the linked material has been censored. (The hardest part of "Two weeks to flatten the curve" was the first two years!)
* Links to longer videos may be followed by a timeline for certain aspects. Also, viewer comment summaries are included for some links, to capture general reader and viewer opinions.
* The links and their summaries are not filtered to have only "politically correct" content. Therefore, the following advisory is in order for the Bolivian Coup link list:

Document linked below is intended for emotionally continent readers only.
Rated: TW ||| Controversial, Politically Incorrect, or Violent themes in some links or text.
Linked video and articles include audio or quotes of people speaking in ordinary and non-ordinary language during ordinary, extraordinary, or violent events that occurred over a period time; accordingly, some content may be graphic and pronouns used may not be gender neutral. If any would be inclined to use that as an occasion to melt, boil over, or otherwise be "triggered", it is strongly suggested that they do not access the links document or the material it links to. If a link has disturbing images, it is usually mentioned in the summary. There are no known links to biologically explicit material, since I use filters to avoid such garbage.

Click HERE for my 2019 Bolivian coup related links list.

DISCLAIMER: Material above about the political connections of people encountered in 1994, and possible ideological links to the 2019 coup, are based on what little investigation was possible from outside of Bolivia. Material about the Water War, Morales regime, and the 2019 coup, is based on review of available material that has been posted, then vetting sources based on their accuracy on previous events and aversion to conspiracy theories. (For example, I give almost no credibility to sources that say the collapse of the WTC twin towers was a "controlled demolition" while ignoring the factual accounts reported by NIST. The NIST findings are largely consistent with any sound engineering analysis.) Material on events after 1994, but prior to the coup, is also based in part on speaking with people who had visited Bolivia during the corresponding times. This document and material linked to it contains a large amount of information. Accordingly, it is not asserted to be free of inadvertent error. Additional disclaimers and conditions in the Versacorp Legal Information page also apply.

Continued in Eclipse Chaser's Journal, Part 4: The Short One: The Total Solar Eclipse of 24 October, 1995

Recommended Reading: Other material related to eclipses, including corona images, umbral images, and my umbral experiments.

Images of the 3 November, 1994 Total Solar Eclipse: Diamond ring, chromosphere, inner corona, middle corona, extreme outer corona, polar to rectangular conversion for a "panorama" of the corona; obvious earthshine on moon; totality and horizon with 20 mm lens; series of six 360 degree panoramas of the umbra before, during, and after totality; instrumentation; images of unique areas in Bolivia. This URL also indirectly links to my images of the 1979, 1991, 1995, (and now 2017) eclipses.

Predicting the Appearance of the Lunar Umbra at Future Total Solar Eclipses

For journals of my other eclipse expeditions, go to Eclipse Chaser's Journal at the EclipseChaser Home Page

EclipseMovie Home Page. Includes a fictional account of an 1869 eclipse.

Need information about eclipses for your planetarium, motion picture, or other project? Jeffrey R. Charles performs science consulting in regard to eclipse phenomena and instrumentation. Please direct inquiries to Jeffrey R. Charles (jcharles *at* versacorp *dot* com) or click here for more information about total solar eclipse related science and engineering consulting.

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Copyright © 1996, 1997, 1998, 2018, 2019, Jeffrey R. Charles. All Rights Reserved.
Registered Copyright MCMXCVIII by Jeffrey R. Charles. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Document (Sections 1 and 2) originated: xx January, 1995
Bolivian experience outline originated: 12 December, 1996
Document converted to HTML: 11 September, 1997
Document (excluding "Afterword" chapter) last modified: 15 June, 1998
Text about Morales regime and 2019 Bolivian coup added: 16 Nov. 2019.
Links, coup updates, and limited elements last modified: 21 Dec., 2019.
Material emphasizing events after 2018 moved to separate web page: 27 Aug. 2023.
Material about the 2020 Bolivian election and its aftermath added: 5 Sep. 2023.

In Memory of:
- Those killed by the 2019 Coup Regime in Sacaba
- Those killed by the 2019 Coup Regime in El Alto
- All others killed or injured by the Coup Regime throughout Bolivia.